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I. Introduction
When people make irresponsible choices, courts customarily hold them
accountable for their actions through civil or criminal sanctions. However,
occasionally courts punish criminal defendants who have made irresponsible
choices by removing or restricting their ability to choose again. Operating
* Candidate for Juris Doctor, Washington and Lee University School of Law, May
2003. I am deeply grateful to Professor Quince Hopkins for her inspiration and guidance in
writing this Note. I could not have written it without the invaluable editorial advice of Christy
McQuality and a last-minute rescue by Patrick Bryant.
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pursuant to probation statutes, courts occasionally have burdened probation
sentences with conditions that restrict the probationers' most personal
decisionmaking.1 Since the late 1960s, appellate courts in the United States
have decided sixteen cases involving probation conditions that restricted an
extremely private choice: whether or not to have children.2
By 1998, the invalidity of a probation condition commanding the defen-
dant not to bear or beget children (hereinafter a "procreation condition")
appeared to be a settled matter. Courts had struck down procreation condi-
tions in all thirteen cases in which they had appeared.3 Nevertheless, in 1998,
an Oregon appellate court affirmed the validity of a procreation condition.4
When the Supreme Court of Wisconsin addressed a procreation condition
three years later, it agreed with the Oregon court's reasoning and upheld the
condition.5
1. See infra Parts II, IV (describing and discussing cases in which courts considered
probation conditions that restricted probationers' reproductive decisions).
2. United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992); People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr.
2d 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984); People
v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1988); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Burchell v.
State, 419 So. 2d 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992 (111. App. Ct. 1995); Trammell v. State, 751
N.E.2d 283 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989); State
v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Richard, 680 N.E.2d 667 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1996); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976); State v. Kline, 963
P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001), cert denied, 537
U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).
3. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992) (striking down
procreation condition); People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 271 (Cal. Ct App. 1992) (same);
People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (same); People v. Dominguez,
64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (same); Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113, 1114
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (same); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 920 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1982) (same); Burchell v. State, 419 So. 2d 358, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (same);
Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (same); People v. Ferrell, 659
N.E.2d 992, 996 (1ll. App. Ct. 1995) (same); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 316 (Kan. Ct.
App. 1989) (same); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952, 953 (La. Ct App. 1986) (same); State v.
Richard, 680 N.E.2d 667, 670 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (same); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d
1335, 1338 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (same). See infra notes 4-5 for citations to the three applica-
ble cases that courts have decided since 1998.
4. See State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (upholding procreation
condition).
5. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 214 (Wis. 2001) (upholding procreation
condition), cert. denied, 537 U.S. ___ 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002). The only other court since Kline
to address a procreation condition considered and rejected Kline's conclusion and chose instead
to follow State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989). See Trammell v. State, 751
N.E.2d 283,289 n.9, 290-91 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (striking down procreation condition).
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The Oregon and Wisconsin decisions illustrate that the propriety of
limiting a probationer's right to procreate is anything but a settled matter.
Given the publicity surrounding Wisconsin's State v. Oakley' decision,7 the
most recent approval of a procreation condition, the question whether such a
condition is within the power of the courts is most urgent. The right to decide
whether to have children, which the Supreme Court has characterized as being
"at the very heart of [a] cluster of constitutionally protected choices,'!" may
hang in the balance for the more than two million Americans placed on proba-
tion each year.9
Part II of this Note will discuss State v. Oakley and State v. Kline," the
two cases in which courts have upheld procreation conditions. Part II then will
6. 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002); see
infra Part 11 (describing case).
7. National coverage of the Oakley decision included news and editorial items in The
Washington Post, The Chicago Tribune, USA Today, National Public Radio's "All Things
Considered," network news programs on ABC, NBC, CBS, and FOX, and an article in Time
magazine. Joan Biskupic, "Deadbeat Dad" Told: No More Kids, Wis. Court Backs Threat of
Prison, USA TODAY, July 11, 2001, at Al, available at 2001 WL 5466543; Glenda Cooper,
Wisconsin Deadbeat Dad Case Tests the Rights to Parenthood; Ruling Sets Conditions on
HavingMore Children, Stirs Debate, WASH. POST, July 15, 2001, atA2, available at 2001 WL
23180643; Leonard Greene, Critics Rip Kid Ban on Deadbeat Serial Dad, N.Y. POST, July 16,
2001, at 13, available at 2001 WL 4094532; Leonard Pitts, Commentary: Deadbeat Dad's
Punishment Is Troubling, CI. TPiB., July 17, 2001, at 17, available at 2001 WL 4094532;
David Van Biema, When Father Equals Convict, Can Judges Jail Problem Dads Just for
Procreating?, TIME, July 23, 2001, at 64, available at 2001 WL 22574717; The Evening News
with Dan Rather: Deadbeat Dad Gets Stern Warning from Wisconsin Supreme Court (CBS
television broadcast, July 11,2001), available at 2001 WL 6115707; Good MorningAmerica:
Wisconsin Supreme Court Rules Deadbeat Dad Cannot Father More Children While on
Probation (ABC television broadcast, July 12,2001), available at2001 WL 21723731; Hannity
& Colmes: One on One with Jeffrey Leving (Fox News Channel cable broadcast, July 18,
2001), available at 2001 WL 23409064; The O'Reilly Factor: Unresolved Problem: How to
Handle Fathers Who Will Not Support Their Children (Fox News Channel cable broadcast, July
12,2001), available at2001 WL 5081416; Today: Wisconsin Court OrdersDeadbeatDad Not
to Have More Children or Face Jail (NBC television broadcast, July 12, 2001), available at
2001 WL 23801419; WeekendAll Things Considered. Dennis Chapman Discusses a Wisconsin
Judge's Decision to Put a Deadbeat Father on Probation with the Stipulation that He Cannot
Father More Children Unless He Can Provide Support (NPR radio broadcast, July 14, 2001),
available at 2001 WL 7766251.
8. Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678,685 (1977).
9. BuREAu OF JusTIcE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, NATIONAL CORRECTIONAL
POPULATION REACHES NEW HIGH: GROWS BY 126,400 DURING 2000 TO TOTAL 6.5 MILUON
ADULTS 4 tbl. 3 (Aug. 26, 2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/ppus00.
pdf. In 2000, the most recent year for which statistics are available, courts sentenced an
estimated 2,032,089 adults to probation in the United States. Id. This number reflects an
increase of 1.6% over the previous year. Id.
10. 963 P.2d 697 (Or. Ct. App. 1998).
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discuss the reasons that each court gave for its decision. Part III will explain
the constitutional protection of individuals' decisions whether to have chil-
dren. In a line of cases stretching back to the 1940s, the Supreme Court has
recognized this fundamental right as a component of the right of privacy. 1
Part III also will explain why courts often consider the procreative rights of
probationers to be less compelling than those of ordinary people. 2
Part IV will discuss the cases in which appellate courts have invalidated
procreation conditions. Although these cases come from several different
jurisdictions, they share some important characteristics. 3 For example, many
courts have stated similar goals of probation, goals that in turn have provided
a basis for striking down the procreation conditions.' 4 Many cases also have
involved the same underlying crime: child abuse.1" Finally, several reviewing
courts have acknowledged the enforcement problems inherent in procreation
conditions. 6
Part V will consider the validity and practicality of procreation condi-
tions."7 Considerations include drafting the conditions to be sufficiently
narrow, realistically enforceable, and logical. Although the purposes of
probation vary among jurisdictions, any condition should fulfill a few basic
common goals - for example, rehabilitation of the offender and protection of
society. Procreation conditions cannot realistically be narrow enough to meet
those goals. In addition, Part V will discuss some of the numerous and
troubling problems of enforcing procreation conditions."5 Among the reasons
the Oakley court gave for its decision was the assertion that criminals neces-
sarily lose their procreative rights when they are imprisoned. Therefore, Part
V will discuss the case of Gerber v. Hickman,9 decided by the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in which a number of dissenters suggested that
11. See infra Part IlI.A (discussing Supreme Court jurisprudence surrounding right of
privacy).
12. See infra Part II.B (discussing lower standard of review for probationers' claims of
right to privacy in reproductive decisionmaking).
13, See infra Part IV (discussing common characteristics of cases striking down procre-
ation conditions).
14. See infra Part IVA (discussing goals of probation).
15. See infra Part V.B (discussing crimes underlying probation sentences with procre-
ation conditions).
16. See infra Part lV.C (discussing enforcement problems with procreation conditions).
17. See infra Part V (relating further policy problems with procreation conditions).
18. See infra Part V.C (discussing additional enforcement difficulties presented by
procreation conditions).
19, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
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courts may not suspend a convicted criminal's fundamental right to procreate,
even during his incarceration.2'
Part VI will conclude that procreation conditions are invalid because they
are unconstitutional as well as impractical and even counterproductive." In
making such decisions in the future, courts should decline to follow the two
recent cases upholding procreation conditions and thereby avert what other-
wise could become an ominous trend.
. Two Courts Uphold Procreation Conditions
Despite the fairly consistent line of cases that voided procreation condi-
tions,2 2 two courts recently upheld such conditions.' The two cases that
upheld procreation conditions share many characteristics with those that
struck down procreation conditions.24 One such common characteristic is
child abuse, with which one case upholding a procreation condition dealt
directly25 and which the other addressed by analogy in its reasoning.26
In 1998, an Oregon court of appeals became the first court to uphold a
procreation condition when it handed down State v. Kline.27 In a separate case
20. See infra Part V.A (discussing Gerber).
21. See infra Part VI (stating conclusions of Note).
22. See infra Part IV (describing cases invalidating procreation conditions and examining
common elements).
23. See infra notes 27, 36, and accompanying text (describing Kline and Oakley cases and
their outcomes).
24. See infra Part IV (describing cases invalidating procreation conditions and examining
common elements).
25. See State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 698-99 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (describing defendant's
prior and recent abuse of children).
26. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208-09 (Wis. 2001) (likening facts of case to
those of Kline), cert. denied, 537 U.S. __ 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).
27. See State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (finding no error in trial
court's imposition of procreation condition). In Kline, defendant Tad Kline had a history of
child abuse. Id. at 698. In this case, Kline had been abusive toward his daughter and his wife
Krista, particularly while he was high on methamphetamines. Id. Krista testified that Kline had
mistreated the child on several occasions. Id. After one incident, Krista finally took the baby
to a physician, where she learned that the child's leg had a spiral fracture. Id. Thereafter, Krista
removed the child from Kline's home and reported the incident to the Children's Services
Division. Id. at 699. After an investigation had commenced, Kline admitted to Krista that he
had caused the spiral fracture and other injuries to the baby. Id. Upon his arrest, Kline
admitted to his problems with drug abuse and anger management. Id. Kline was convicted of
criminal mistreatment and sentenced to probation, with conditions including the following:
"You may not[,] without prior written approval by the Court [and] following the successful
completion of a drug treatment program and anger management program and any other program
directly related to counseling related to [] your conduct towards children[,] father any child."
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several years earlier, a court had terminated the parental rights of defendant
Tad Kline, who had a history of drug abuse, had broken his infant son's arm,
and had inflicted numerous additional minor injuries on the infant.2" Kline
and his wife later had a baby daughter, and Kline admitted to causing a spiral
fracture in the baby's leg and bruising her chest and head.29 Kline's wife
testified that she also was aware of other injuries to the baby, such as an
apparent concussion for which she did not seek medical treatment because
Kline threatened her life and the baby's.3° The court convicted Kline, who
admitted to having drug and anger management problems, of criminal mis-
treatment.3 The trial court, in sentencing Kline to probation, ordered him not
to father any children until he successfully completed drug-treatment and
anger-management programs.32 The Court of Appeals of Oregon found that
the trial court, in setting the procreation condition, had duly considered the
case history, Kline's history of abuse and noncompliance with probation
conditions, and the unavailability of viable alternatives.3 Furthermore, the
court found that the procreation condition, "in the light of [Kline's] potential
for violence associated with his anger and drug abuse problems," would
protect any children that Kline might father.3 4 Because it determined that the
infringement upon Kline's procreative rights was temporary and that the lower
court could modify the condition when Kline completed treatment, the appel-
late court upheld the condition. 5
Three years after Kline, the Wisconsin Supreme Court considered a
procreation condition in State v. Oakley, a case in which the lower court
convicted the defendant of willfully refusing to pay child support. 36 David
Id. On appeal, Kline claimed that such a probation condition impinged on his fundamental right
to procreate and that the trial court should have performed a "less restrictive means analysis"
to ensure the condition's validity. Id. Kline argued in favor of the less restrictive means test
to ensure that the court narrowly tailored the probation condition to achieve a legitimate state
goal. Id. The appellate court disagreed, finding that the procreation condition did not com-
pletely remove Kline's fundamental liberty. Id. Because the procreation condition protected
Kline's potential victims and interfered with his procreative rights only "to a permissible
degree," the court upheld the condition. Id.
28. Id. at 698.
29. Id. at 699.
30. Id. at 698.
31. Id. at 698-99.




36. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 202 (Wis. 2001) (describing background of
case), cert denied, 537 U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002). In Oakley, the Wisconsin Supreme
1550
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Oakley had nine children borne by four different women and had not paid any
child support for 120 days when the state charged him with willful nonpay-
ment of child support - a crime with felony status in Wisconsin. 7 At the time
of Oakley's arrest, his payments in arrears exceeded $25,000.38 Sentencing
Oakley to three years in prison followed by five years on probation, the trial
judge imposed the following procreation condition: "Defendant is ordered not
to have any further children while on probation unless it can be shown to the
Court that he is meeting the needs of his other children and can meet the needs
of this one."39 The case proceeded on appeal to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court upheld a procreation condition for a defendant convicted of felony refusal to pay child
support. Id. at 213. At the time of his arrest, David Oakley had failed to pay any child support
for 120 days and was in arrears more than $25,000. Id. at 202. Four different women bore
Oakley's nine children. Id. The trial judge sentenced Oakley to three years in prison, followed
by five years of probation that included the following condition: "Defendant is ordered not to
have any further children while on probation unless it can be shown to the Court that he is
meeting the needs of his other children and can meet the needs of this one." Id. at 217 (Bradley,
J., dissenting). The Wisconsin Supreme Court began its analysis by noting that "[e]nforcing
child support orders ... has surfaced as a major policy directive in our society." Id. at 204. In
Wisconsin, the court explained, trial judges have broad discretion in imposing probation
conditions, but the following considerations limit their discretion: the conditions must promote
the rehabilitation of the probationer and must protect society and potential victims from any
future crimes by the probationer. Id. at 206. The trial judge had imposed Oakley's procreation
condition after suggesting that it might convince Oakley to "stop victimizing his children." Id.
at 207. The court interpreted this imposition as an attempt to rehabilitate Oakley trom his crime
of willful nonpayment as well as an attempt to protect Oakley's potential victims - his
children - from future unpaid support orders. Id. The court then addressed Oakley's constitu-
tional argument, which centered on his fundamental right to procreate. Id. at 207-08; see also
infla Part II.A (explaining basis of constitutional claim for right to privacy in reproductive
decisionmaking). Oakley argued that the lower court failed to narrowly tailor the procreation
condition because it removed, rather than merely restricted, his right to procreate during his
probation. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 207-08. Oakley supported his argument by pointing out that
he likely would never be able to support his children. Id. at 208. The Wisconsin Supreme
Court responded by stating that Oakley did not enjoy the fundamental right to procreate to the
same degree as those not convicted of crimes. Id. Likening the case to State v. Kline, 963 P.2d
697 (Ore. Ct. App. 1998), the court determined that Oakley merited not a "narrowly tailored"
test but instead a less rigorous one. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 210. A probation condition that
infringed on a probationer's fundamental rights was permissible, the court determined, as long
as the condition was not overly broad and had a reasonable relationship to the probationer's
rehabilitation. Id. Because the procreation condition did not actually eliminate Oakley's
fundamental right, because it would help Oakley conform his conduct to the law, and because
the condition was less restrictive than imprisoning Oakley for his full term (which, the court
noted, would necessarily suspend Oakley's procreative rights entirely), the court upheld the
condition. Id. at 212-13.
37. See id. at 201-02 (describing case background).
38. Id.
39. Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
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Court. After discussing the troublesome state of child support nonpayment on
a national scale, the court examined Oakley's procreation condition to deter-
mine whether it was appropriate.4" As the court explained, the discretion of
the trial judge who sentenced Oakley and created the probation condition was
subject only to the goals of probation: rehabilitating the probationer and
protecting society and potential victims from future crimes.4 The trial judge
had determined that the sentence would convince Oakley to stop willfully
refusing to pay child support; the appellate court interpreted this determina-
tion to mean that the procreation condition would rehabilitate Oakley from his
criminal behavior and protect his children, who also were his potential vic-
tims, from future nonsupport.4
Conceding the facial appropriateness of his procreation condition, Oakley
argued that it infringed on his fundamental right to choose whether to procre-
ate.43 On the grounds that the condition actually removed his right to procre-
ate during probation because he never would be able to support his children,
Oakley asked the court to protect his fundamental right by invalidating the
condition under a "strict scrutiny" test. However, because Oakley was a
convicted felon, the court instead applied a lower level of scrutiny by examin-
ing the condition to ensure that it was not overbroad and that it was reasonably
related to Oakley's rehabilitation.45 In support of this reduced scrutiny, the
Oakley court recited the facts and holding of Kline.46 The court analogized
Oakley's crimes to Kline's by likening Oakley's chronic nonsupport of his
40. See id. at 203-13 (describing child support nonpayment as "a crisis with devastating
implications for our [nation's] children" and reviewing validity of Oakley's procreation
condition).
41. See id. at 206 (discussing trial judge's process of sentencing Oakley).
42. See id. at 206-07 (concluding that Oakley's sentence satisfied goals of probation in
Wisconsin).
43. See id. at 207-08 (discussing Oakley's constitutional claim); see also infra Part MA
(describing constitutional basis for fundamental right to make procreation decisions).
44. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d. at 202 (describing Oakley's argument for strict scrutiny of
his procreation condition). Oakley argued that the procreation condition in reality would
eliminate his right to decide whether to have more children during probation. Id. He based this
assertion on the Supreme Court's decision in Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 376 (1978),
which commanded strict scrutiny for state action that infringed on a related fundamental right -
that of marriage. Oakley, 629 N.W. 2d at 208.
45. See id. at 210 ("[G]iven that a convicted felon does not stand in the same position as
someone who has not been convicted of a crime, ... 'conditions of probation may impinge upon
constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the
person's rehabilitation."' (quoting Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 79, 84-85 (Wis. 1976))).
46. See id. at 208-09 (describing Kline and citing its rationale and holding with approval).
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children to Kline's continuing physical abuse of his own.' The court found
that Oakley's procreation condition was not overly broad because it did not
actually eliminate his fundamental right; instead, it allowed him to satisfy the
condition by supporting his children and demonstrating his ability to support
another."" Because the procreation condition encouraged Oakley to conform
his conduct to the law, the court determined that the condition was reasonably
related to Oakley's rehabilitation.49 Therefore, the court upheld the procre-
ation condition.'0
1. Constitutional Considerations
The outcomes of Kline and Oakley contradict almost thirty years of case
law in which appellate courts consistently invalidated procreation condi-
tions." To begin its exploration of how the decisions in Kline and Oakley
potentially set an undesirable precedent, this Note will explain the constitu-
tional basis of an individual's right to make private reproductive decisions.
A. The Right to Privacy in Reproductive Decisionmaking
As courts have considered whether they could restrict probationers from
having children, many specifically have mentioned the constitutional infringe-
ment that accompanies a procreation condition. 2 The constitutional right at
47. Id.
48. See id. at 212 (upholding procreation condition).
49. Id. at213.
50. Id.
51. See infra Part IV (describing cases that overturned procreation conditions and
exploring their common elements).
52. See People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 268 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) (quoting People
v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984), for proposition that condition in-
fringed defendant's fundamental right to privacy); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 364
(Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("There is, of course, no question that the [procreation] condition imposed
in this case infringes the exercise of a fundamental right to privacy protected by both the federal
and state constitutions."); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982)
(responding to defendant's assertions that procreation condition "impermissibly restricted his
fundamental rights to... procreation" with assertion that "constitutionally protected rights can
be abridged by conditions of probation if they are reasonably related... to the rehabilitative
purposes of probation"); State v. Negrete, 629 N.E.2d 687, 690 (11. Ct. App. 1994) (stating that
"[a] woman's right to procreate is protected by the federal constitution"); State v. Mosburg, 768
P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) ("The probation condition regarding pregnancy unduly
intrudes on Mosburg's right to privacy."); State v. Richard, 680 N.E.2d 667,670 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996) (calling procreation condition "an unreasonable burden" on already pregnant woman and
additionally finding it unconstitutional); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct.
App. 1976) (same).
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stake is the right to privacy," a fundamental liberty interest that permits
citizens to make individual decisions regarding reproductive matters.54
Although the Supreme Court has not settled upon the precise constitutional
origins of the right to privacy, the Court has attributed the right to the "penum-
bras" surrounding rights defined by the First, Third, Fourth and Fifth Amend-
ments to the Constitution.55 Elsewhere, the Court has located the origins of
the right in the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause, 6 while
concurring Justices have claimed that the right more properly originated
within the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.57
The Court first suggested that a right to privacy concerning reproductive
matters might exist in Skinner v. Oklahoma," a decision that overturned a
state statute allowing the sterilization of repeat criminals.59 The Court specifi-
53. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357,363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("[T]he discretion
to impose conditions of probation... [is] circumscribed by constitutional safeguards. Human
liberty is involved. A probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degree of privacy, or
liberty, under... the federal Constitution.") (internal quotations omitted).
54. JOHN E. NOwAx & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTrTONAL LAW § 14.26 (6th ed.
2000). The right to privacy, which can have several meanings, "currently relates to certain
rights of freedom of choice in marital, sexual and reproductive matters." Id.
55. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-86 (1965) (concluding that "[t]he
present case ... concerns a relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several
fundamental constitutional guarantees").
56. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 538 (1942) (describing challenged statute
as failing "to meet the requirements of the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment").
57. See id. at 545 (Stone, C.J., concurring) (disagreeing with majority's equal protection
rationale and asserting instead that "[a] law which condemns, without hearing, all the individu-
als of a class to so harsh a measure ... because some ... may merit condemnation, is lacking
in the first principles of due process").
58. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
59. See Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that "the instant
legislation runs afoul of the equal protection clause"). In Skinner, the Court struck down as
unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment an Oklahoma statute that authorized the
sterilization of repeat criminals. Id. The statute permitted the state-instigated procedure on any
criminal who was convicted three times of crimes evincing "moral turpitude." Id. at 536. The
lower court had convicted the defendant of stealing chickens. Id. The defendant had two
previous convictions for robbery with firearms. Id. at 537. In its analysis, the Court highlighted
the serious nature of the consequences that Oklahoma sought to impose: "We are dealing here
with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and procreation
are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race." Id. at 541. The Court focused
on the statute's exemptions, crimes that the Oklahoma legislature had determined did not evince
moral turpitude. Id. at 538-39. Such crimes included embezzlement. Id. The Court discussed
the obvious similarities between the non-exempt crime of larceny and the exempt crime of
embezzlement, including their similar punishment by fine and imprisonment. Id. Because the
statute afforded different treatment to criminals convicted of the two crimes, the Court found
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cally addressed the question as one of equal protection because the statute
contained exceptions for certain crimes, such as embezzlement, that the state
legislature deemed not to evince the "moral turpitude" of crimes such as
larceny.6° Furthermore, the Court subjected the statute to heightened scrutiny
because it concerned "one of the basic civil rights of man .... Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.61
Nearly twenty years later, Justice Harlan, in a dissenting opinion in Poe
v. Ullman,62 specifically recommended that the Court recognize a right to
privacy.63 Poe involved a statute that made the use of contraceptives illegal,
and Justice Harlan argued that the application ofthe statute to married persons
invaded their marital privacy.' Such an invasion, he suggested, violated the
Due Process Clause because the decisions of married people regarding repro-
ductive matters are intensely private.
65
When Griswold v. Connecticut," a case nearly identical to Poe, reached
the Supreme Court four years later, the majority found that a statute banning
that the statute invidiously discriminated against criminals convicted of larceny. Id. at 541.
Finding it unnecessary to discuss other ways in which the statute violated the Equal Protection
Clause, the Court expressly declined to consider any other questions of constitutionality. Id.
at 538.
60. See id. at 541 (finding equal protection violation by statute).
61. Id.
62.' 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
63. See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 551-54 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (arguing that
citizens' constitutional rights against invasions of "privacy" should extend not only to physical
searches and seizures but also to unwarranted intrusions into marital sexual relations). In Poe,
the Court upheld the dismissal of suits (by two married women and a doctor) seeking injunc-
tions against enforcement of Connecticut's long-unenforced laws criminalizing the use of
contraceptives. Id. at 508-09. The two women each sought to receive instruction from the
doctor on the proper use of contraception because a pregnancy would have endangered their
lives or health. Id. at 498-500. If the doctor had instructed the women as requested, he would
have been liable under the Connecticut statutes as an accessory. Id. at 500. When the parties
sought the opinion of the state attorney regarding prosecution under the statutes, the state
attorney answered that he would enforce the statutes. Id. at 500-01. The suits challenged the
constitutionality of the statutes. Id. The Court found that the state's prosecuting officials had
not prosecuted anyone (with the exception of two doctors and a nurse charged with running a
birth control clinic in 1940) for violating the statute, despite the fact that it had been in force
for nearly eighty years. Id. at 501-02. Because the threat of enforcement by state prosecutors
was not imminent and because the three plaintiffs were not in immediate danger of sustaining
direct injury as a result of enforcement, the Court found that no justiciable controversy existed
to warrant constitutional examination of the statutes. Id. at 508-09. It therefore upheld the
dismissal of the actions. Id.
64. Id. at 551-52 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
65. Id. (Harlan, J., dissenting).
66. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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contraceptive use was an unacceptable infringement on married individuals'
right to privacy." The Court found the idea of enforcing laws against marital
reproductive decisionmaking "repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding
the marriage relationship."' In a subsequent case, Eisenstadt v. Baird,69 the
Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause to invalidate a contraception
statute that treated unmarried persons differently from married persons."0 The
67. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485-86 (1965) (finding that statutory ban
on contraception unacceptably infringed right of married persons to privacy). In Griswold, the
Supreme Court declared unconstitutional a Connecticut statute forbidding the use of contracep-
tives because the statute impermissibly invaded married persons' privacy. Id. The state
successfully prosecuted the executive director and medical director of a Planned Parenthood
clinic in New Haven under the same law challenged in Poe v. Uliman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961).
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480. In considering the constitutional challenge, the Court stated that the
case invited "a wide range of questions that implicate the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment." Id. at 481. The Court considered previous case law surrounding the First
Amendment and found that it "has a penumbra where privacy is protected from governmental
intrusion." Id. at 483. Other enumerated rights contained in the Bill of Rights had penumbras
as well, the Court found, such as the Third Amendment prohibition against mandatory quarter-
ing of soldiers, the Fourth Amendment protection against search and seizure of personal items
within the home, and the Fifth Amendment shield against forced self-incrimination. Id. at 484.
These examples invoked a right of privacy, secured by the Ninth Amendment provision that
enumerated rights did not preclude or limit other rights retained by the people. Id. The Court
therefore found that the Connecticut statute concerned matters that fell within the zone of
privacy that the Constitution indirectly created. Id. at 485. Because the statute swept more
broadly than necessary in restricting contraception (by limiting the use, rather than the manufac-
ture, of contraceptives), the Court found that the statute could not stand. Id.
68. Id. at 486.
69. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
70. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 454-55 (1972) (holding that Massachusetts
laws banning distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons or by anyone other than
physicians or pharmacists violated Equal Protection Clause). In Eisenstadt, the Supreme Court
struck down as unconstitutional two Massachusetts statutes controlling the dispensation of
contraceptives. Id. The state convicted William Baird, who was neither a physician nor a
pharmacist, for giving away contraceptive foam to a young woman after a lecture at Boston
University. Id. at 440. The statutes declared that only married individuals could obtain
contraceptives and then only from a licensed pharmacist upon a doctor's prescription. Id. at
440-41. The Court noted that the statutes created three "classes" of persons: "first, married
persons may obtain contraceptives to prevent pregnancy, but only from doctors or druggists on
prescription; second, single persons may not obtain contraceptives from anyone to prevent
pregnancy, and, third, married or single persons may obtain contraceptives from anyone to
prevent, not pregnancy, but the spread of disease." Id. at 442. The issue, the Court declared,
was "whether there [was] some ground of difference that rationally explain[ed] the different
treatment accorded married and unmarried persons." Id. The Court found the statutes so
"riddled with exceptions" that Massachusetts could not reasonably have intended to use them
to deter premarital sex. Id. If the Massachusetts legislature instead had intended that the
statutes promote public health, the Court continued, then the statutes "invidiously
discriminate[d] against the unmarried... [and were] overbroad with respect to the married."
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Court stated: "If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental
intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision
whether-to bear or beget a child."'" As a result, the right to privacy that
included the freedom to make procreative decisions appeared to extend to all
adults. A year later, the Court further elaborated on the right and its breadth:
The Constitution does not explicitly mention any right ofprivacy. In a line
of decisions, however[] ... the Court has recognized that a right of per-
sonal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy, does
exist under the Constitution. [Previous cases) also make it clear that the
right has some extension to activities relating to marriage, ...
procreation, ... contraception, ... family relationships ... and child
rearing and education....'
The standard of review that the Court established to determine the legitimacy
of contraception legislation in Carey v. Population Services International"
reinforces the importance of the right to privacy, particularly with respect to
reproductive decisions.74 Because legislation regulating reproduction burdens
Id. at 451. Finally, if the statutes prohibited contraception for unmarried people on moral
grounds, then it improperly discriminated against such persons under Griswold. Id. at 453. On
the scope of Griswold's right to privacy, the Court said:
It is true that in Griswold the right of privacy in question inhered in the marital
relationship. Yet[] [i]f the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion
into matters so fundamentally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or
beget a child.
Id. The Court therefore held the statutes void for violating the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 454-55.
71. Id. at453.
72. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
73. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
74. See Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-85 (1977) (explaining that
privacy right is one aspect of "liberty" that Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment
protects). In Carey, the Court struck down those parts of a New York statute that allowed only
pharmacists to sell contraceptives and that banned the advertisement or display of contracep-
tives to the extent that they provided information about contraceptive availability and price. Id.
at 681-82. The plaintiff corporation, Population Planning Services, regularly advertised and
conducted mail-order sales of contraceptives to New York residents. Id. The Court began its
analysis by acknowledging the right to privacy as described in Roe v. Wade and further
explained that "[tihe decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very heart of this
cluster of constitutionally protected choices." Id. at 685. The Court then described the
appropriate standard of review - any regulations that imposed a burden on such a fundamental
decision were justifiable only by compelling state interests and needed to be narrow in scope
so as to further only those interests. Id. at 686. As to the first challenged part of the statute
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an adult's right to privacy, a statute must satisfy "strict scrutiny" review to
justify such impingement." Specifically, this test commands that when "a
decision as fundamental as that whether to bear or beget a child is involved,
regulations imposing a burden on it may be justified only by compelling state
interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests."76 The
Court has made clear its suspicious view of any legislation affecting personal
decisions of whether to conceive."
Because legislation must satisfy such strict standards, courts tread
carefully when their decisions will affect the right to privacy in reproductive
decisionmaking. 5 In all the procreation condition cases, state or federal
statutes authorized the probation conditions that the trial courts imposed.79 By
acting in accordance with such laws, the trial judges imposed a condition that
would have been impermissible had they imposed the condition on persons
without criminal convictions;"° however, the defendants in these cases were
convicted criminals. Thus, the question in the probation context is whether,
(permitting only pharmacists to distribute nonmedical contraceptives to persons sixteen years
old or older), the state asserted such interests as the protection of public health, safety, and
potential life and the maintenance of quality control. Id. at 690. The Court found none of those
interests to be sufficiently compelling. Id. at 691. Likewise, for the second challenged section
of the statute (prohibiting the display or advertisement of contraceptives), the state asserted
interests in protecting sensitive customers from embarrassment and in avoiding the legitimiza-
tion of sexual activity for young people. Id. at 700-01. Again, the Court found neither of the
asserted interests to be compelling, particularly when held against the plaintiff's First Amend-
ment interest in truthful product availability and pricing information. Id. at 701. Because the
Court did not find these interests compelling, it struck down the challenged sections of the
statute. Id.




78. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357,363 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) ("The discretion
to impose conditions of probation [under state law] is ...circumscribed by constitutional
safeguards. Human liberty is involved. A probationer has the right to enjoy a significant degree
of privacy... under the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the federal Constitution.")
(internal quotation marks omitted); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 314-15 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989) (noting that "[t]here are... limitations on probation conditions that infringe on constitu-
tionally protected rights" and finding that contested procreation condition "unduly intrudes on
Mosburg's right to privacy").
79. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 205 (Wis. 2001) (noting that Wisconsin law
permitted trial judge to impose probation with conditions in lieu of authorized prison term),
cert denied, 537 U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).
80. See id. at 208 (conceding that Oakley's right to privacy argument "might well carry
the day" were he not convicted felon).
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and to what degree, probationers have a reduced right to privacy, such that
procreation conditions are constitutionally permissible.
B. Diminished Right for Probationers?
Although the United States Supreme Court has addressed the question of
Fourteenth Amendment procedural due process for probationers,"' the Court
has left to the lower courts the task of determining the appropriate standard of
review for probationers' substantive due process.8 2 Probationers who appeal
their procreation conditions often ask appellate courts to subject the conditions
to strict scrutiny. 3 Courts respond that probationers, by virtue of being
convicts, merit less protection of their fundamental rights. 4 Although the
courts differ on the level of scrutiny that they will give to a temporary restric-
tion on a probationer's procreative rights, they agree that the presence of a
fundamental right affects their analysis of a probation condition that impinges
upon that right.
8 5
In appealing his procreation condition, David Oakley asked the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to apply strict scrutiny, an issue that the justices discussed at
length in the majority, concurring, and dissenting opinions. 6 The majority
ultimately determined that the correct test in Wisconsin was whether the
condition was reasonably related to the probationer's rehabilitation and was
not overbroad.' Although the majority conceded that Oakley's assertion of
81. See Stacey L. Arthur, The Norplant Prescription: Birth Control, Woman Control, or
Crime Control?, 40 UCLA L. REv. 1, 83-84 (1992) (discussing procedural due process for
probationers under Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972), and Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411
U.S. 778 (1973), in context of probation conditions ordering use of specific type of birth
control).
82. See Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 208-12 (citing state case law as precedent for different
standard of review for probationer's fundamental rights).
83. See id. at 207 ("Oakley argues that the condition here warrants strict scrutiny.").
84. See Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918,919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("Under Florida
law, constitutionally protected rights can be abridged by conditions of probation if they are
reasonably related to the probationer's past or future criminality or to the rehabilitative purposes
of probation.").
85. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Conditions that
restrict a probationer's freedom must be especially fine-tuned." (quoting United States v. Tolla,
781 F.2d 29, 34 (2d Cir. 1986))); People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App.
1984) ("Where a condition of probation requires a waiver of precious constitutional rights, the
condition must be narrowly drawn.... ." (quoting People v. Mason, 5 Cal. 3d 759, 768 (1971))).
86. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 208-12 (Wis. 2001) (discussing appropriate
standard of review), cert. denied, 537 U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002); id. at 214-15 (Bablitch,
J., concurring) (same); id. at 215 (Crooks, J., concurring) (same); id. at 217 (Bradley, J.,
dissenting) (same); id. at 221-22 (Sykes, J., dissenting) (same).
87. See id. at 210 ("[G]iven that a convicted felon does not stand in the same position as
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a constitutional right might "carry the day"s if he were not a convict, the fact
that he was a convict required a lower standard of review."'
California courts have stated that procreation conditions unquestionably
infringe on a probationer's constitutional right to make reproductive
decisions. 90 As one court explained, although California law allows judges
broad discretion in imposing probation conditions, constitutional guarantees
"circumscribe" such discretion.9' That court analyzed the procreation condi-
tion under "special scrutiny," inquiring whether the condition was necessary
to serve probation's goals of rehabilitation and public safety.'
An Indiana appellate court has stated that some level of infringement
upon a probationer's fundamental rights is acceptable.93 However, because
procreation conditions involve fundamental rights, the court declared that the
infringing condition "must be designed to accomplish the explicit goals of
protecting the community and promoting the probationer's rehabilitation
process."9 4
Florida courts have agreed that probation conditions can abridge constitu-
tionally protected rights in some circumstances.9 5 However, Florida courts'
level of review appears to be lower than that applied in California.' 6 One
Florida district court of appeals has explained that a probationer's procreation
condition would be constitutionally valid if it bore a reasonable relationship
to his past criminality, his future criminality, or probation's rehabilitative
purposes.'
someone who has not been convicted of a crime... 'conditions of probation may impinge upon
constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related to the
person's rehabilitation.'" (quoting Edwards v. State, 246 N.W.2d 79, 84-85 (Wis. 1976))).
88. Id. at 208.
89. See id. at 208-10 (discussing standard of review).
90. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 ("There is, of course, no question that the [proba-
tion] condition imposed in this case infringes the exercise of a fundamental right to privacy
protected by both the federal and state constitutions.").
91. See id. at 367 (determining validity of procreation condition).
92. See id. at 369 (discussing appropriate standard of review).
93. See Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) ("Within certain
parameters, the [probation] condition may impinge upon the probationer's exercise of an
otherwise constitutionally protected right." (quoting Smith v. State, 727 N.E.2d 763, 767 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2000))).
94. Id. (quoting Purdy v. State, 708 N.E.2d 20, 23 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999)).
95. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) ("[T]he constitu-
tional rights of probationers are limited by conditions of probation which are desirable for the
purposes of rehabilitation.").
96. Compare id. (declaring standard as "reasonably related") with People v. Pointer, 199
Cal. Rptr. 357,365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (applying "special scrutiny").
97. See Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) ("Under Florida
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The less rigorous constitutional standard has not meant that Florida courts
uphold procreation conditions." On the contrary, Florida courts consistently
have applied an analytical tool called the Dominguez test" to determine
whether a reasonable relationship exists between the procreation condition and
the goals of probation."oc The case law is so set against the validity of procre-
ation conditions that in the most recent case involving a procreation condition,
the court ignored the fact that the defendant had neglected to preserve her
argument for appeal." Instead, the court called her procreation condition
"grossly erroneous on its face" and overturned it in a two-paragraph opinion."°
In a different case, a Florida court vacated a procreation condition in a three-
sentence opinion. 3 These cases demonstrate that the validity of procreation
conditions does not turn only on the constitutional question. 4 In the next Part,
this Note will discuss some additional important aspects of the decisions that
have struck down procreation conditions.
IV Courts Strike Down Procreation Conditions as Invalid
Ever since a California court first considered a procreation condition in
1967,105 appellate courts almost uniformly have struck down procreation
law, constitutionally protected tights can be abridged by conditions of probation if they are
reasonably related to the probationer's past or future criminality or to the rehabilitative purposes
of probation.").
98. See Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. Dist Ct. App. 1988) (overturning
procreation condition using Dominguez test as adopted in Rodriguez); Howland, 420 So. 2d at
919-20 (same); Burchell v. State, 419 So. 2d 358, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (striking down
procreation condition and relying on Rodriguez's precedent); Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9-10
(overturning procreation condition using Dominguez test as adopted by California Supreme
Court in People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (1975)). See infra Part IV for an explanation of the
Dominguez test for reasonableness of probation conditions.
99. See infra Part IV (describing Dominguez test, which courts use to evaluate probation
conditions).
100. See supra note 98 (listing relevant Florida cases and their use of Dominguez test as
adopted in Rodriguez).
101. See Thomas v. State, 519 So. 2d 1113, 1114 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (evaluating
condition despite failure of defendant to preserve issue for appeal because court deemed
condition "grossly erroneous on its face").
102. Id.
103. See Burchell v. State, 419 So. 2d 358, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (striking down
procreation condition in three-sentence opinion that included following sentence: "See
Rodriguez v. State.").
104. See supra note 97 (relating Florida court's determination that procreation condition
was not necessarily constitutionally infirm).
105. See People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 294 (Cal. Ct App. 1967) (overturning
probation condition that barred unmarried woman convicted of robbery from becoming
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conditions."as In a substantial number of these cases, the courts stated similar
goals of probation, discussed child abuse as the underlying crime, and ex-
pressed concern over the enforcement problems inherent in procreation
conditions. The following three subparts of this Note will describe the
common elements of the cases in which courts overturned procreation condi-
tions.
A. Common Goals of Probation
The first common factor among cases striking down procreation condi-
tions is the -requirement that judges tailor probation to satisfy certain goals;
specifically, a probation condition is reasonable only if it helps to rehabilitate
the defendant and to protect society against the commission of future
crimes.)" Because of differences in state and federal case law and statutes,
the language of probationary goals can vary widely."08 However, two common
goals that emerge as a pattern are rehabilitation and societal protection."r9
A significant case addressing procreation conditions is People v.
Dominguez," 0 in which a California court struck down a procreation condition
for a woman who was convicted as an accessory to a robbery."' The court
pregnant again while unmarried). The California appellate courts have struck down every
procreation condition that has come before them since Dominguez. For examples, see People
v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263,274 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992), and People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr.
357, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
106. See supra note 3 (listing appellate decisions striking down procreation conditions).
107. See, e.g., United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 961 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The test for
determining the validity of a special probation condition [in a case subject to federal law] is
'whether it fosters rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the public.'" (quoting United
States v. Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289,291 (3d Cir. 1989))); Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283,
288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating that Indiana law allowed probation conditions "reasonably
related to the person's rehabilitation" and interpreting probation conditions to be valid if they
"will produce a law abiding citizen and protect the public"); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313,
314 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (stating that requirement that conditions "serve the accused and the
community" limited otherwise broad discretion of trial courts in Kansas in setting probation
conditions); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (citing Ohio
statute that limited special probation conditions to those serving "the interests of doing justice,
rehabilitating the offender, and insuring his good behavior").
108. Compare State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952,953 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (stating only that
"probation conditions, to be valid, must be reasonably related to the rehabilitation of the
defendant") with State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (citing state
code to assert that purpose of probation was to do "justice, rehabilitat[e] the offender, and
insur[e] his good behavior").
109. Supra note 107 and accompanying text.
110. 64Cal. Rptr. 290(Cal. Ct.App. 1967).
111. See People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) (describing
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examined the controlling section of the California Penal Code, which ad-
dressed what courts refer to as "special" probation conditions - those that go
beyond simply restricting illegal conduct." 2 Special conditions, according to
the Dominguez. court, should serve the ends of justice, make amends to society
and to any victim for the injury and breach of law, and assist in the rehabilita-
tion and reformation of the probationer." 3 By reducing the statutory language
to the two underlying principles of criminal rehabilitation and public protec-
tion, the court formulated the test that many other state courts use to evaluate
procreation conditions:114
A condition of probation which (1) has no relationship to the crime of
which the offender was convicted, (2) relates to conduct which is not in
background of cas). In Dominguez, a California appellate court struck down a probation
condition ordering a young woman not to become pregnant while unmarried. Id. at 294.
Mercedes Dominguez was the driver for two women who robbed a liquor store. Id. at 292. Her
sentence for second-degree robbery included probation on the condition that she not live with
any man to whom she was not married and not become pregnant unless married. Id. The trial
judge explained Dominguez's probation condition by warning her that he would revoke her
probation for "just becoming pregnant. You are going to prison unless you are married first."
Id. Dominguez lost her probationary status when she became pregnant after a birth control
failure. Id. at 293. Noting that the California probation statute instructed courts to impose
"reasonable" probation conditions, the appellate court elucidated a three-part test for reasonable-
ness. Id. The court proceeded to evaluate Dominguez's procreation condition under the test
and found that future pregnancy was unrelated to robbery and that pregnancy outside marriage
was "a misfortune" but not criminal. Id. Finally, the court found that no reasonable relationship
between pregnancy and the future commission of crime existed, noting: "Contraceptive failure
is not an indicium of criminality." Id. The court finished its analysis by criticizing the trial
judge for attempting to serve the public interest by imposing unreasonable probation conditions.
Id. at 294. Finding evidence in the record that the judge meant the procreation condition to
prevent having additional children on welfare rolls, the court stated that "[p]robation orders are
not merely bookkeeping arrangements." Id. Overturning Dominguez's procreation condition,
the court stated that she should have had her probation reinstated unless she had violated a valid
probation condition. Id. The Dominguez test is the same as the Dominguez/Lent test, adopted
by the California Supreme Court in People v. Lent, 541 P.2d 545 (Cal. 1975). For discussion
of California courts' use of the Dominguez/Lent test, see People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357,
364 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (identifying origin of DominguezLent test and applying it to case sub
judice).
112. See Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (discussing validity of procreation condition).
113. See id.
114. See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263, 267-68 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992)
(quoting and citing Dominguez test); Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct App.
1982) (using Dominguez test as adopted in Florida by Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1979)); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952, 953 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (using
Dominguez test without expressly citing or quoting Dominguez); State v. Richard, 680 N.E.2d
667, 670 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996) (using Dominguez test as adopted in Ohio by State v. Livingston,
372 N.E. 2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976)).
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itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct which is not reasonably
related to future criminality does not serve the statutory ends of probation
and is invalid.'
The Dominguez court went on to evaluate the procreation condition according
to this three-part test. 16 Because nonmarital pregnancy was not a crime, had
no relationship to robbery, and was unlikely to lead to future crimes, the court
struck down the procreation condition as invalid.'17 The condition did not
meet California's stated goals of probation."'
8
Other courts also have addressed the goals of probation in procreation
condition cases. An Indiana court of appeals, like the California courts,
indicated that the goals of probation primarily are to rehabilitate the defendant
and to protect the public from future crimes." 9 In Trammell v. State,20 the
court examined the applicable state statute and found that special conditions
must relate reasonably to the probationer's rehabilitation.' Prior Indiana
115. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293.
116. See id. at 293-94 (using three-part test to find procreation condition invalid).
117. Id. at294.
118. See id. at 293 ("Some unusual probation conditions have been upheld in California,
but none of them is comparable to the challenged condition.").
119. See Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (stating goals of
probation).
120. 751 N.E.2d 283 (nd. Ct. App. 2001).
121. See Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283,288 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (discussing standard
of review for special probation conditions). In Trammell, an Indiana appellate court vacated
the procreation condition of a woman convicted of felony neglect of a dependent. Id. at 291.
Trammell, a mildly mentally retarded woman, failed to seek medical attention when her infant
son suffered from chronic vomiting and severe diarrhea. Id. at 285. Despite the fact that she
had an older child who suffered from an esophageal disorder requiring surgical correction,
Trammell ignored her son's failing health. Id. at 285-86. The infant died early one morning
from malnutrition, but Trammell did not try to awaken or feed him until approximately twelve
hours later, at which time she realized that he had died. Id. at 286. One of the conditions of
Trammell's eight-year probation was that she not become pregnant. Id. Because of the
constitutional liberty involved, the appellate court declared that the following three factors were
necessary to consider: "(1) the purpose sought to be served by probation; (2) the extent to
which constitutional rights enjoyed by law abiding citizens should be afforded to probationers;
and (3) the legitimate needs of law enforcement." Id. at 288. The court found that the procre-
ation condition accomplished nothing toward Trammell's rehabilitation because it would not
improve her parenting skills or help her care for a child born after her probation ended. Id. at
288-89. The court found the argument that Trammell enjoyed a significant right to privacy
under the Constitution, as explained in Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S.
678 (1977), to be persuasive. Id. at 290. The court remanded the case with instructions that the
trial court vacate the procreation condition and instead impose conditions that would rehabili-
tate Trammell, avoid excessive infringement of her constitutional rights, and protect the public.
Id. at 291.
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case law had interpreted this statute to mean that a special condition was valid
if it would "produce a law abiding citizen and protect the public.'122 The
Trammell court considered these practical goals alongside Trammell's consti-
tutionally protected interests and found that the procreation condition was
invalid."2 3 Specifically, the procreation condition would not serve to rehabili-
tate Trammell because she would not learn how to be a better or more skilled
parent as a result of the restriction.124 The condition also would fail to protect
the public. 2 ' In addition, the condition would impinge excessively on
Trammell's constitutional rights.26 Those factors outweighed the court's
third consideration - the legitimate needs of law enforcement.' 2 7 For this
reason, the court ordered the trial court to vacate the procreation condition."8
The Indiana court, like the California court in Dominguez, considered the
goals of rehabilitation and public protection to be significant in probation
questions.
129
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit and Florida, Kansas, and
Ohio courts have struck down procreation conditions citing similar concerns
regarding the goals of probation. 3' The constitutional concern, while criti-
122. Id. at 288.
123. See id. at 288, 291 (elucidating three factors to balance in considering procreation
condition and finding that Trammell's case warranted removal of procreation condition).
124. See id. at 289 ("[The condition] does nothing to improve [Trammell's] parenting skills
or educate her regarding perinatal care or child nutrition and development should she choose
to become pregnant after her probationary period expires or even happen to become pregnant
while on probation.").
125. See id. at 288 (criticizing procreation condition as lacking value for rehabilitative or
public-protection purposes). Presumably, the court considered the "public" to be Trammell's
future children.
126. See id. at 290-91 (noting that decision "whether or not to beget or bear a child is at
the very heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices" (quoting Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977))).
127. Id. at 288 (identifying three factors to balance in evaluating whether probation
condition unduly intruded on constitutional rights).
128. See id. at 291 (remanding case for imposition of new probation conditions that would
sufficiently account for goals of probation and defendant's constitutional rights).
129. See id. (instructing trial court to modify conditions so that they "protect the commu-
nity, reasonably relate to Trammell's rehabilitation, and do not excessively impinge upon her
privacy rights").
130. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960,961 (8th Cir. 1992) ("The test for determin-
ing the validity of a special probation condition [under federal law] is 'whether it fosters
rehabilitation of the defendant and protection of the public.'" (quoting United States v.
Schoenrock, 868 F.2d 289, 291 (8th Cir. 1988))); Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1979) (explaining that under Florida law probation conditions are valid if they serve
"useful rehabilitative purpose"); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 314 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989)
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cally important, has not been the sole concern for appellate courts that have
addressed procreation conditions."' Regardless of the jurisdiction where a
procreation condition case originated, courts consistently have examined
whether the condition meets the goals of probation in determining its
validity.' 32 Even if an appellate court finds a procreation condition constitu-
tionally valid, it still likely will need to address the dual primary goals of
probation conditions.'
B. Child Abuse
The second common concern in the procreation condition cases is child
abuse.'34 Eight of the fourteen cases that overturned procreation conditions
involved convictions for child abuse, often of heartbreaking dimensions that
sometimes included the abused child's death.'35 The significance of this
commonality is that the courts in the two cases upholding procreation condi-
tions used child abuse, or an offense that the court deemed analogous to it, to
justify upholding the procreation conditions in question. However, as the
(stating that requirement that conditions "serve the accused and the community" limited broad
discretion of Kansas trial courts to set probation conditions); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d
1335, 1337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1976) (citing Ohio state statute that limited special probation
conditions to those serving "the interests of doing justice, rehabilitating the offender, and
insuring his good behavior").
131. Cf supra Part Il (discussing constitutional basis for asserting probationers' procre-
ative rights and explaining that conviction may diminish those rights).
132. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding no
constitutional infirmity with procreation condition that court nevertheless struck down as
invalid).
133. See id. at 9-10 (finding "no constitutional invalidity" with procreation condition yet
subsequently finding condition invalid under Dominguez test).
134. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 359 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (identifying issue
as one that concerned "a woman convicted of the felony of child endangerment"); Howland v.
State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (noting that defendant "stands convicted
of the crime of negligent child abuse"); Burchell v. State, 419 So. 2d 358, 358 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (overturning defendant's probation condition without discussion; background
obtained from Mother in Abuse Case Given Three Years in Prison, HOUST. CHRON., Mar. 1,
1985, at 1, available at 1985 WL 3639718); Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 8 (identifying defendant's
crime as "aggravated child abuse"); People v. Ferrell, 659 N.E.2d 992, 993 (Il1. App. Ct. 1995)
(identifying defendant's crime as "aggravated battery of a child"); Trammell v. State, 751
N.E.2d 283, 286 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (describing defendant's crime as "neglect of a dependent"
and "a Class B felony"); State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (describing
defendant's crime as "endangering a child"); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1336 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1976) (describing defendant's crime as "cruel abuse of a child resulting in serious
physical harm").
135. See supra note 134 (identifying cases with child abuse as underlying crime).
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following cases illustrate, many courts have considered and rejected child
abuse as a basis for restricting the abuser's right to reproduce.
A fairly representative case from the line of cases striking down procre-
ation conditions is the Florida case ofRodriguez v. State,36 in which the court
found defendant Kathy Rodriguez guilty of aggravated child abuse after she
hit her nine-year-old child in the face and slammed the child against a car.137
The trial court granted Rodriguez probation on several "special" conditions." 8
Those conditions included not having custody of any children, not marrying
without the court's consent (which the court would withhold if the prospective
groom had young children), and not becoming pregnant.'
39
Applying California's Dominguez test to Rodriguez's probation condi-
tions, the appellate court determined that the condition barring Rodriguez
from having custody of any children was valid; the condition was related to
her crime of physically abusing her child, addressed conduct that was crimi-
nal, and was an attempt to prevent future child abuse. 40 The court then
evaluated the other two special probation conditions, one requiring the court's
consent to get married and the other forbidding Rodriguez from becoming
136. 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979).
137. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (providing back-
ground facts of case). In Rodriguez, a Florida appellate court invalidated probation conditions
that restricted Rodriguez's ability to marry or to have children. Id. at 10. The trial court had
placed the defendant on ten years' probation. Id. at 8. Among the special conditions of
probation were conditions that Rodriguez not possess or drink alcohol, not have custody of any
children, and not become pregnant again. Id. The final special condition was that Rodriguez
not marry without the express consent of the court. Id. The court would not grant consent if
Rodriguez desired to marry a man with young children. Id. Rodriguez challenged the condi-
tions based on her fundamental privacy rights, such as the right to many and the right to
procreate. Id. Although the appellate court acknowledged that Rodriguez's constitutional rights
were indeed at stake, it also stated that rehabilitative probation conditions could limit these
rights. Id. at 9. The court considered guidelines from the ABA as well as the test first eluci-
dated in People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290,293 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967): "[A] condition [of
probation] is invalid if it (1) has no relationship to the crime of which the offender was con-
victed, (2) relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or forbids conduct
which is not reasonably related to future criminality." Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 9. However,
the condition barring Rodriguez from having custody of any children was valid because it
directly related to child abuse and thus avoided all three pitfalls of the Dominguez test. Id. at
10. The conditions regarding marriage and childbearing did not relate directly to her crime of
child abuse, were not crimes themselves, and did not reasonably relate to future criminality as
long as the first condition prevented her from having custody of any children. Id. The proba-
tion conditions regarding pregnancy and marriage were therefore invalid, while the remaining
conditions were valid. Id.
138. See id. at 8 (summarizing probation conditions that trial court imposed).
139. Id.
140. See id. at 10 (evaluating special probation conditions).
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pregnant. 4 The court reasoned that marriage and procreation could relate to
further criminal behavior only if Rodriguez, as a result thereof, gained custody
of a minor child. 42 This result was precisely what the first condition pre-
vented.143 The Court therefore found that the two latter conditions did not
reasonably relate to Rodriguez's crime, and thus it struck down those condi-
tions of her probation. 44 Thus, despite the child-endangering nature of Rodri-
guez's crime, the court acknowledged that forcing her to refrain from bearing
children was not a sufficiently narrow means of achieving the goals of proba-
tion.1
45
A second case, People v. Pointer,"4 illustrates how appellate courts strike
down procreation conditions even in cases of child abuse that involve the near
death of a child. 47 In Pointer, the Court of Appeal of California considered
141. See id. (holding such conditions invalid).
142. See id. (evaluating validity of second and third special probation conditions under
Dominguez test).
143. See id. (identifying reasoning in evaluation of special probation conditions).
144. See id. (striking down invalid probation conditions).
145. See id. (stating that conditions "add nothing to decrease the possibility of further child
abuse or other criminality").
146. 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984).
147. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 359-60 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (describing
background of case). In Pointer, the defendant adhered to a very strict "macrobiotic" diet that
included mainly grains, vegetables, and beans. Id. at 359 n.2. Despite repeated warnings from
her physician that the diet was unhealthy and inappropriate for young children, Pointer imposed
it on her young sons, Jamal and Barron. Id. at 359. After Barron's father contacted Children's
Protective Services, the agency instructed Pointer to take her children to a pediatrician. Id.
Two different doctors advised Pointer during the next two months that both of her sons, Jamal
in particular, were severely undernourished. Id. When she took Jamal to the recommended
pediatrician for an appointment, the child was "emaciated, semicomatose, and in a state of
shock," and the doctor contacted the police. Id. at 360. Over Pointer's objections, officials
hospitalized the child. Id. Upon Jamal's release, a court placed him in a foster home, but
during a visit with him, Pointer abducted Jamal and took both sons with her to Puerto Rico. Id.
An FBI agent located and arrested Pointer in Puerto Rico, where Pointer had continued to force
the diet on the children. Id. A court convicted Pointer of felony child endangerment. Id. at
359. The court sentenced Pointer to five years probation, the conditions of which included
Pointer spending a year in jail, participating in a counseling program, remaining ignorant of the
whereabouts of Jamal, not having custody of any children (including her own), and not
conceiving during the probationary period. Id. at 360. On appeal, the court considered the
validity of the procreation condition, acknowledging its infringement on Pointer's right to
privacy and balancing that against the Dominguez factors. Id. at 364. Finding that the proba-
tion condition bore some relationship to the crime, the court next determined whether less
restrictive means were available to achieve the goals of probation. Id. The court observed that
the procreation condition "was apparently not intended to serve any rehabilitative purpose but
rather to protect the public by preventing injury to an unborn child." Id. at 365. On that basis,
the court found that pregnancy testing, followed by careful prenatal monitoring, if needed, and
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a procreation condition for a young mother who nearly starved both of her
young sons to death." Ruby Pointer, who followed a strict "macrobiotic" diet
that consisted mainly of grains and beans, also forced her two- and four-year-
old sons to follow the diet despite its obviously detrimental effect on their
health.149 Pointer disregarded repeated medical advice to stop restricting the
children's diet in this manner. 5 ' The diet severely stunted both boys' mental
and physical growth, and the younger son, Jamal, was semi-comatose and near
death when Pointer was arrested. '' After her release, Pointer abducted Jamal,
whom the court had placed in foster care, and took both children to Puerto
Rico.' When authorities again arrested Pointer and returned her to Califor-
nia, they discovered that she had continued to feed the children strictly ac-
cording to her macrobiotic diet." 3 Medical workers in California described
both children as seriously underdeveloped and determined that Jamal in
particular suffered from permanent neurological damage.'54
Pointer's sentence for felony child endangerment included probation on
the condition that she not have custody of any children, including her own,
and that she not conceive any more children during the probationary period. 5 '
On appeal, the court acknowledged that the trial judge had been correct in his
grave assessment of Pointer's situation."5 6 Not only had Pointer harmed her
children continually over a long period of time, but she also showed no
removal of any child from Pointer's custody upon birth, would satisfy the goals of probation
while infringing on Pointer's constitutional rights to the least extent practicable. Id. Because
the procreation condition was not the least restrictive method to achieve the goals of Pointer's
probation, the court invalidated that condition and remanded the case to the trial court. Id. at
366.
148. See id. at 360-61 (describing background of case).







156. See id. at 362 (observing trial judge's reasoning in imposing procreation condition).
The court noted that the condition
was imposed only after thoughtful consideration by the trial judge, who fully
appreciated the extraordinary nature of his action. As he stated at the sentencing
hearing, "I have never considered imposing as a condition of probation the require-
ment that someone not conceive during the period of probation ... but that's
certainly what I intend to do in this case. This is an extremely serious case." ...
This assessment is supported by the record.
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remorse or acknowledgment of wrongdoing.'5 7 It appeared likely that she
would behave the same way in the future toward any children in her
custody.
58
Using the Dominguez test, the court evaluated the relationship between
the probation condition and Pointer's crime and rehabilitation. 59 The Pointer
court noted that earlier procreation condition cases had lacked a convincing
correspondence between child abuse and future crime; however, the relation-
ship was more direct in this case."6 Based on trial evidence that Pointer's
dietary habits could affect a developing fetus, the court concluded that any
harm that Pointer might cause to future children might very well occur in
utero." To address this concern, the court first noted that because Pointer's
probation barred her from having custody of any children, any child to whom
she gave birth during her probation could find safety immediately through
placement in a foster home. 62 Next, the court noted that courts could reduce
the chance of Pointer injuring future children in utero by testing Pointer
regularly for pregnancy; in the court's opinion, this prenatal monitoring
condition was no more difficult than monitoring Pointer for probation viola-
tions." Finally, the court noted that forcing Pointer to choose between
continuing a pregnancy and staying out ofjail might be "coercive of abortion,"
an "improper" position for the court to take.'6 The appellate court in Pointer
arrived at the same conclusion as the court in Rodriguez - conviction for child
abuse does not warrant a procreation condition, even though the condition
might at first glance seem appropriately rehabilitative.'
65
C. Enforcement Problems
The final commonality among many ofthe cases that struck down procre-
ation conditions is the courts' acknowledgment that procreation conditions
have inherent enforcement difficulties.' Several courts have pointed out that
157. See id. (evaluating Pointer's individual likelihood of future criminality).
158. Id.
159. See id. at 363-66 (evaluating validity of defendant's probation condition).
160. Id. at364.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 365.
163. Id.
164. Id. at366.
165. See id. (striking down Pointer's procreation condition as undue infringement on
constitutional rights because narrower means were available).
166. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992) ("Moreover, the
condition is unworkable. Short of having a probation officer follow Smith twenty-four hours
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procreation conditions could entail unreasonable demands on probation
officials, could coerce a probationer or a probationer's partner into aborting or
jeopardizing a fetus, or could duplicate unnecessarily the effect of valid.
probation conditions. 67 Each of these possible consequences merits closer
examination.
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, in striking down the procre-
ation condition of a man convicted on federal drug charges, explained why the
condition was "unworkable": "Short of having a probation officer follow
[defendant] Smith twenty-four hours a day, there is no way to prevent Smith
from fathering more children."'" Likewise, the Pointer court mentioned a
discussion that occurred during Pointer's sentencing hearing.16 9 The prosecu-
tor in that case had argued that probation and children's services personnel,
already strained in their resources, would be unable to monitor Pointer for
pregnancy. 70 Although the Pointer court declined to address the issue because
it lacked evidence on the record, the court's acknowledgment reinforces the
practical impossibility of charging probation officers with the duty of ensuring
that their probationers do not conceive. 71 The very notion calls to mind
Justice Douglas's question in Griswold v. Connecticut: 'Vould we allow the
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of
the use of contraceptives?" '72 His question reminds us that this use of law
enforcement resources would be nearly as unacceptable as the invasion of
privacy in the field of contraception.
Courts invalidating procreation conditions have repeatedly expressed
concern over what might result if a probationer or a probationer's partner were
to become pregnant while the condition was in effect.'73 In State v.
a day, there is no way to prevent Smith from fathering more children."); People v. Pointer, 199
Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (relating psychologist's trial testimony that cast doubt
upon whether Pointer willingly would use birth-control pills and discussing danger that
procreation might be "coercive of abortion").
167. See infra notes 168-97 and accompanying text (discussing various courts' analyses
of enforcement problems of procreation conditions).
168. Smith, 972 F.2d at 962.
169. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365.
170. See id. (mentioning discussion from sentencing hearing).
171. See id. at 365-66 (declining to address strain of monitoring defendant's pregnancy
status on resources of probation officials and Children's Protective Services).
172. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,485 (1965).
173. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
Pointer, in event that she became pregnant, might avoid prison only by abortion and thus
probation condition would be "coercive of abortion, [which is] in our view improper"); State
v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313,315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (characterizing Mosburg's choices, should
she become pregnant while on probation, as concealing her pregnancy, having abortion, or
going to prison).
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Mosburg,17 1 for example, the court stated that Mosburg, who had abandoned
a two-hour-old baby in a parking lot, would have an untenable choice should
she become pregnant while subject to a procreation condition.17  Mosburg
would have to choose among three options: conceal her pregnancy (and
therefore obtain no prenatal care for the expected child), have an abortion, or
go to prison. 76 The Mosburg court quoted the California court in Pointer,
which had noted that procreation conditions amount to judicial coercion of
abortion on pain of imprisonment. 77 Similarly, in Oakley, a case that upheld
a procreation condition, 7 ' a dissenting justice voiced similar concerns about
imposing such a condition on a man.' The justice argued that the threat of
imprisonment upon the birth of any new child created a "strong incentive" for
the defendant to persuade the pregnant woman to obtain an abortion.' Given
a strong incentive to have his partner end the pregnancy, the defendant presum-
ably would also have a motive to try to make her conceal the pregnancy.'
Again, these incentives would jeopardize the viability of the fetus by reducing
the chance that the woman would obtain proper prenatal care. 2
174. 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989).
175. See State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (describing
underlying crime and discussing enforcement difficulties). In Mosburg, the defendant pleaded
no contest to the charge of endangering a child. Id. at 313. The recently divorced mother of
three children, Mosburg abandoned her two-hour-old baby in an unlocked truck that she found
in a restaurant parking lot. Id. Her sentence included a year in jail and subsequent parole with
conditions that included a procreation condition. Id. at 314. The appellate court stated that
parole conditions in Kansas "are governed by the same law that controls probation conditions."
Id. A state statute gave broad discretion to trial courts in imposing probation conditions. Id.
However, because the procreation condition interfered with Mosburg's right to privacy, the
court surveyed case law from other states and found that other courts uniformly had invalidated
procreation conditions. Id. Agreeing that the procreation condition unduly infringed on
Mosburg's right to privacy and expressing concern over the choices that Mosburg would have
to make if she became pregnant during probation, the court ordered the trial court on remand
to invalidate the condition. Id. at 315-316.
176. Id. at315.
177. Id.
178. See supra notes 36-50 and accompanying text for a discussion of State v. Oakley, 629
N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001), cert. denied, 537 U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002), one of two cases in
which a court upheld a procreation condition.
179. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 219 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
("Because the [procreation] condition is triggered only upon the birth of a child, the risk of
imprisonment creates a strong incentive for a man in Oakley's position to demand from the
woman the termination of her pregnancy."), cert. denied, 537 U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).
180. See id. at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (discussing possible implications of upholding
procreation condition).
181. Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
182. See State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313,315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (hypothesizing female
PROBATION CONDITIONS THAT RESTRICT PROCREATION
A third concern that courts have raised in connection with procreation
conditions is that such conditions are unnecessarily duplicative of valid
probation conditions."8 3 Courts have approved conditions barring defendants
from having custody of any children when their crimes potentially endanger
any children in their custody. 84 For example, in Rodriguez,"8 5 the same court
that found no constitutional bar to procreation conditions discussed these
conditions' lack of a reasonable relationship to probationary goals."6 Rodri-
guez's other probation conditions included one that forbade her custody of
any child, including her own.'87 Therefore, the court held that the procreation
condition could not reasonably relate to future criminality because the first
condition effectively prevented Rodriguez from having custody of - and
therefore abusing - any child that she might bear during probation.' Simi-
larly, in Howland v. State,"9 a Florida court invalidated the procreation
condition of a child abuser whose other probation conditions forbade him to
have contact with his child or to live with any other minor children."
probationer's actions should she become pregnant while subject to procreation condition).
183. See Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding that
procreation condition upon defendant convicted of negligent child abuse was unnecessary for
protection of children because his other probation conditions forbade him from having any
contact with child that he had abused or from residing with any minor children); Rodriguez v.
State, 378 So. 2d 7, 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (holding that procreation condition, in
addition to restricting marriage, did not reasonably relate to future criminality because another
probation condition specifically forbade defendant from having custody of any children).
184. See Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10 (permitting probation condition that prohibited
defendant from having custody of any children).
185. See supra note 137 for a discussion of Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1979).
186. See Rodriguez, 378 So. 2d at 10 (applying Dominguez test discussed in supra Part
IVA).
187. See id. at 8 (providing background of case).
188. See id. at 10 (holding that procreation condition did not reasonably relate to future
criminality under Dominguez test).
189. 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
190. See Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (providing
background of case). In Howland, the probationer's conditions included not having contact
with the victim that he had abused (who also was his own child), as well as not living with any
child under the age of sixteen. Id. The procreation condition forbade him from "fathering" any
children while on probation; the court read "fathering" to mean begetting children. Id. The
court found that the procreation condition, although it might have related to future criminality
by preventing Howland from abusing any additional children, was unnecessary. Id. at 920. The
condition could have prevented future criminality "only if appellant had custody of the child or
was permitted to have contact with the child," possibilities already prevented by the other
conditions. Id. Also finding that Howland's sentence exceeded the statutory maximum time
limit, the court reversed the sentence and remanded the case to the trial court for resentencing.
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Courts have identified other enforcement problems in addition to the
unnecessary duplication of other probation conditions. For example, in
United States v. Smith,191 the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit noted
that a procreation condition could be counterproductive." In imposing the
condition, the trial court had expressed concern over the defendant's inade-
quate support of the several children that he already had." On appeal, the
reviewing court opined that a violation of the procreation condition would
result in his imprisonment, rendering him even less likely to support the
existing or new children. 94 A Kansas court identified another enforcement
problem in State v. Mosburg:95 the fallibility of birth control. 96 Citing
language from the Pointer case suggesting that "even the best contraceptive
methods sometimes fail" and questioning "the wisdom of attaching criminal
status to such failure," the Mosburg court concluded that punishing a proba-
tioner for using a contraceptive method that fails is beyond a state's power."9
Procreation conditions, in addition to not serving the goals of probation, have
inherent enforceability problems that render them impractical, undesirable,
and unnecessary.
Id.
191. 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992).
192. See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992) (examining and
rejecting procreation condition as undue infringement on Smith's constitutional rights, then
characterizing condition as "unworkable" as well). In Smith, the Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit struck down the procreation condition of a drug convict who had fathered as
many as five children, all with different mothers. Id. at 961. The court determined that special
probation conditions may deprive a probationer's liberty only if "fine tuned" to be rehabilitative
for the defendant and protective of the public. Id. The court did not believe that preventing
Smith from fathering more children would rehabilitate him from dealing heroin. Id. at 962.
Other, narrower conditions could have served the purpose of rehabilitation more effectively
while not infringing Smith's fundamental rights. Id. In addition, the court determined that the
procreation condition was "unworkable" because enforcement would require such extraordinary
means as constant supervision. Id. The court also noted that enforcing the condition would
have prevented Smith from supporting any of his children, including the one or more whose
birth resulted in his probation revocation. Id. The court therefore remanded Smith's case for
resentencing. Id.
193. See id. at 961 (citing statement of sentencing judge, who indicated that "[tihe court
gets concerned whether [it is] a revolving door" for children in need of support).
194. See id. at 962 (characterizing procreation condition as "unworkable").
195. See supra note 175 for a discussion of State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App.
1989).
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V Kline and Oakley Revisited: Unconstitutional and Impractical
The constitutional considerations for probationers with procreation
conditions are certainly paramount.'" Many courts have subjected procre-
ation conditions to close scrutiny or have found them unconstitutional alto-
gether.' Moreover, a dissent in a recent case from the Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit suggested that even incarcerated criminals retain some
procreative and privacy rights.2" However, even a court that finds a procre-
ation condition constitutionally permissible still will face the practical consid-
erations of tailoring the condition sufficiently to meet the goals of probation
and overcoming the condition's enforcement problems."' These consider-
ations cast doubt upon the propriety of the decisions in Oakley and Kline.2
A. The Right to Privacy and the Gerber Question
An assumption that the Oakley court stated explicitly, and that perhaps
underlay the Kline court's decision as well, was that the defendants would
completely lack procreative rights if they were prisoners instead of probation-
ers.2 3 Other courts that have decided procreation condition questions appar-
ently did not subscribe to this assumption, but rather gave significant constitu-
198. See supra Part lA (describing constitutional protection of right to privacy in
individual reproductive decisionmaking).
199. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 365 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (subjecting
condition to "special scrutiny" and demanding that it be "narrowly drawn" because it involved
"a waiver of precious constitutional rights"); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 (Ohio
Ct. App. 1976) (finding procreation condition unconstitutional).
200. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617,624-25 (9th Cir. 2002) (Tashima, J., dissent-
ing) (acknowledging that prisoners must give up some privacy rights due to security concerns,
but stating that those conditions did not exist in current case, and therefore implying that some
privacy rights may survive incarceration).
201. See Rodriguez v. State, 378 So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (finding no
constitutional infirmity in procreation condition, but subjecting it to Dominguez test for
reasonableness and relationship to goals of probation).
202. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 219 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(disagreeing with majority's decision to uphold Oakley's procreation condition), cert denied,
537 U.S. _, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002). The dissent stated:
In addition to the obvious constitutional infirmities of the majority's decision [to
uphold the procreation condition], upholding a term of probation that prohibits a
probationer from fathering a child without first establishing the financial where-
withal to support his children carries unacceptable collateral consequences and
practical problems.
Id. (Bradley, J., dissenting).
203. See id. at 209 n.25 ("If Oakley were incarcerated, he would be unable to exercise his
constitutional right to procreate.").
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tional protection to probationers." °  The issue of prisoners' procreative rights
generated strong arguments in the case of Gerber v. Hickman.20 In Gerber,
204. See Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (subjecting condition to "special scrutiny" and
demanding that it be "narrowly drawn" because it involved "a waiver of precious constitutional
rights"); Livingston, 372 N.E.2d at 1337 (finding procreation condition unconstitutional).
205. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 623 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding procreation
inconsistent with incarceration and thus upholding warden's decision to prohibit prisoner from
arranging for sperm shipment). In Gerber, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit en bane
upheld the dismissal of prisoner William Gerber's action, which Gerber brought to compel
California prison authorities to allow Gerber to provide sperm for the artificial insemination of
his wife. Id. at 619. Gerber asked prison authorities to allow him, at his own expense, to collect
semen in a medical container and mail it to a Chicago laboratory where Gerber's wife could
retrieve it for use in insemination attempts. Id. Prison authorities refused Gerber's request. Id.
Under Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), the court determined that it needed to make two
inquiries: (1) whether a right to procreation was consistent with a person's incarcerated status,
and if so, (2) whether the state had legitimate penological interests to justify infringing on
Gerber's fundamental rights. Gerber, 291 F.3d at 620. The court discussed Gerber's procre-
ative rights as inextricably bound up with the right to mary, which in itself was not incompati-
ble with incarceration. Id. at 621. However, the majority reasoned that incarceration naturally
restricted the marital benefits of intimate association and that "[tihe loss of the right to intimate
association is simply part and parcel of being imprisoned for conviction of a crime." Id.
Grouping procreation with other physical attributes of marriage that an incarcerated individual
surrenders while imprisoned, the majority went on to find that procreation is fundamentally
inconsistent with incarceration. Id. at 623. Regardless of such considerations as reproductive
technology, the majority found that a restriction on procreation flowed naturally from the
"nature and goals of the correctional system, including isolating prisoners, deterring crime,
punishing offenders, and providing rehabilitation." Id. at 622. Because Gerber's assertion of
a right to procreation did not meet the first prong of the Turner analysis, the court did not
proceed to the second question - whether the state served legitimate penological interests in
denying that right. Id. at 623. In dissent, Judge Tashima called into question the logic of the
majority's reasoning. Id. at 624 (Tashima, J., dissenting). If procreation were indeed funda-
mentally inconsistent with incarceration, then the dissent questioned why California allowed
many prisoners to have conjugal visits, during which conception easily could occur. Id. at 626-
27 (Tashima, J., dissenting). While the dissent agreed that some attributes of the right to
privacy were inconsistent with incarceration, the dissent argued that security concerns, not
punishment, could justify the infringement of such attributes. Id. at 624-25 (Tashima, J.,
dissenting). "If, in fact, the purpose behind prohibiting procreation is to punish offenders, this
is a determination that should be made by the legislature, not the Warden." Id. at 626 (Tashima,
J., dissenting). Because the California legislature had made no such determination, the dissent
argued that Gerber's right of procreation was not fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration
and that the court therefore should have addressed the second prong of the Turner test before
making a decision. Id. at 629 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
Cf Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), superseded by Gerber v. Hickman,
291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002) (hereinafter Gerber (superseded)). The Gerber (superseded)
decision, which the Gerber decision replaces for all legal purposes, contained far stronger
assertions of Gerber's procreative rights while imprisoned. See Gerber (superseded), 264 F.3d
at 888 ("[W]e hold that the right to procreate does indeed survive incarceration."). The three-
judge panel observed that Turner established that prisoners have a fundamental right to marry,
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although a Ninth Circuit panel agreed with the Oakley court that a prisoner
had no procreative rights while incarcerated, several judges wrote strong
opinions to the contrary - both in the original hearing and in the rehearing.2 °6
Their arguments call into question the Wisconsin court's assertion that Oakley
necessarily would have lost his procreative rights if he went to prison and that
he therefore had no cause to complain if a probation condition also denied him
those rights.2 7
As a prisoner serving a life sentence in California, William Gerber had
no right under state law to conjugal visits, so he and his wife could not
achieve conception through traditional means.2'e However, they hoped to
conceive through artificial insemination.209  The procedure required that
Gerber send his semen in a special mailer to a laboratory at the Chicago
Medical Center.210 When Gerber requested that the prison accommodate this
procedure, prison officials refused, so Gerber filed a lawsuit. 1 When the
case first reached the Ninth Circuit, the original panel determined that
Gerber's fundamental right to procreate existed even during his
incarceration; 12 in addition, it found that the state had asserted no penological
interests that justified its restriction of Gerber's right.213 After a rehearing en
even though they cannot enjoy all of marriage's benefits. Id. In addition, the court observed
that Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) stood for a prisoner's right to procreate once
he was out of prison. Gerber (superseded), 264 F.3d at 888. In looking at these cases together,
the court determined that they "suggest that the fundamental right of procreation may exist in
some form while a prisoner is incarcerated, despite the fact that a prisoner necessarily will not
be able to exercise that right in the same manner or to the same extent as he would if he were
not incarcerated." Id. at 889. The court asserted that its finding was consistent with its holding
in other cases that prisoners had no fundamental right to conjugal visits. Id. at 890. Having
found that incarcerated criminals have a fundamental right to procreate, the Gerber (superseded)
court proceeded to find that the state had shown no valid penological reasons to deny Gerber's
rights in this case. Id. at 892.'
206. See supra note 205 (describing Gerber, its dissent, and original decision that it
superseded).
207. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 209-10 (Wis. 2001) (comparing Oakley's
constitutional status as probationer to constitutional status of prisoner), cert denied, 537 U.S.
123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).




211. Id. (describing insemomplaint).
212. See Gerber v. HiEckman, 264 F.3d 882, 890 (9th Cir. 2001) ("In sum, we conclude that
the fundamental right to procreate survives incarceration."), superseded by Gerber v. Hickman,
291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
213. Id. at 891-92 (finding that state had failed to offer legitimate government interest
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banc, the new holding was six-to-five against Gerber's assertions of his
rights.214 One dissenter, Judge Tashima, criticized the majority's finding that
procreation was fundamentally inconsistent with incarceration.21 Judge
Tashima argued that the majority unjustly characterized procreative rights as
physical and likened the right of procreation to the right of physical
intimacy.216 In Gerber's case, were the prisoner allowed conjugal visits, his
wife might conceive.217 Therefore, procreative rights must not befundamen-
tally inconsistent with incarceration, or the legislature would not allow
conjugal visitation for prisoners at all.218 Judge Tashima expressed a desire
to hear the prison's reasons for denying Gerber his procreative rights; like the
judges in the superseded opinion, he also may have found that the denial
furthered no valid penological objective.219
The superseded and dissenting opinions generated by Gerber contradict
Oakley's assertion - and Kline's apparent assumption - that prisoners retain
no fundamental right to procreation.22 The Oakley majority prominently
noted that Oakley would have had no right to procreate if the trial judge
instead had imprisoned him for the last five years of his sentence.221 The court
justifying denial of Gerber's right to procreate).
214. See Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 624 (9th Cir. 2002) (affirming district court's
dismissal of appellant's complaint and listing five dissenting judges).
215. Id. at 624-29 (Tashima, J., dissenting).
216. See id. at 625 (Tashima, J., dissenting) ("Procreation through artificial
insemination... implicates none of the restrictions on privacy and association that are neces-
sary attributes of incarceration .... None of the rights that are necessarily curtailed by
incarceration are at issue here.").
217. See id. at 626-27 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (discussing conjugal visitation as it relates
to prisoners' ability to procreate).
218. See id. at 626 (Tashima, J., dissenting) ("If, in fact, the purpose behind prohibiting
procreation is to punish offenders, this is a determination that should be made by the legislature,
not the Warden.").
219. See id. at 629 (Tashima, J., dissenting) (arguing to "vacate the [dismissal] and remand
for further proceedings, including an evidentiary hearing to determine whether legitimate
penological concerns justify this restriction").
220. Compare State v. Oaldey, 629 N.W.2d 200, 209 n. 25 (Wis. 2001) ("If Oakley were
incarcerated, he would be unable to exercise his constitutional right to procreate.") with Gerber
v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617, 632 (9th Cir. 2002) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) (stating that prison
authorities "cut[ ] off Gerber's fundamental right to procreate"), and Gerber v. H-ickman, 264
F.3d 882, 884 (9th Cir. 2001) ("We conclude that the right to procreate survives
incarceration. .. ."), superseded by Gerber v. Hickman, 291 F.3d 617 (9th Cir. 2002).
221. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02. The opening paragraph of the majority opinion
stated:
[B]ecause Oakley was convicted of intentionally refusing to pay child support...
and could have been imprisoned for six years, which would have eliminated his
PROBATION CONDITIONS THAT RESTRICT PROCREA TION
included this assertion in the introduction to the majority opinion.2" If the
reasoning of the Gerber dissent is correct, however, then Oakley might have
been able to procreate while in prison by using reproductive technologies.
Therefore, a probation condition that restricted Oakley's right to have children
could have been an even greater restriction on his fundamental right to indi-
vidual reproductive decisionmaking than a prison sentence. 3
B. Meeting the Goals of Probation
The procreation condition cases present a few very basic goals of proba-
tion: the rehabilitation of the probationer and the protection of society and
potential victims.224 Tailoring procreation conditions to meet these goals is
difficult - perhaps impossible.22 First, probation conditions that restrict the
probationer's right to privacy in reproductive matters are of questionable
rehabilitative value, regardless of whether the underlying crime is child abuse
or a different type of crime; second, they are not the best means'available to
protect society or future victims.226
Procreation conditions cannot rehabilitate if they do not help probation-
ers stop committing the crimes that led to their convictions.2 As the
Trammell court noted, a procreation condition does not rehabilitate a child-
abusing probationer.22 However, a person convicted of child abuse may be
right to procreate altogether during those six years, this probation condition, which




223. The strange procedural history of Gerber and its rehearing may lead the reader to
believe that the question of prisoners' procreative rights is so tangential that it might not arise
again. However, the issue is not an anomaly, a recent Pennsylvania criminal case involving a
prisoner who smuggled semen to his wife so that she could become pregnant illustrates the fact
that reproductive technologies will continue to press the question. See Marc Levy, Return
Semen, Wife Demands: Government Opposes Giving Back Reputed Mobster's Smuggled
Sperm, HARRISBURG PATRIOT, Feb. 12, 2002, at BI (describing case of Maria Parlavecehio,
who is serving probation for smuggling her husband's sperm out of minimum-security prison).
224. See supra Part IV.A (discussing common goals of probation).
225. See supra Part IV.A (discussing common goals of probation).
226. See Trammell v. State, 751 N.E.2d 283, 288-89 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (expressing
concern that procreation condition did not assist child-abusing mother to become better parent
and stating that probation condition served no rehabilitative purpose).
227. See id. at 289 (stating that procreation condition for child abuser "does nothing to
improve her parenting skills or educate her regarding perinatal care or child ... development
should she choose to become pregnant after her probationary period expires").
228. See id. at 288 ("The trial court's order that Trammel not become pregnant while on
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able to obtain help from counseling, parenting classes, or supervision by child
welfare workers.229 The Oregon court took this approach in setting Tad
Kline's probation condition: the court ordered him to obtain counseling for
his abusive habits and drug dependency.23°
Furthermore, procreation conditions do not protect potential victims
against future crimes.23' For example, a condition that bars the probationer
from bearing or begetting more children is not as protective of potential
victims as one that simply restricts the probationer's contact with children.
A Florida court upheld such a probation condition in Howland.232 Howland's
probation condition barred him from having custody of any children or from
living in a home with young children. 3 The court reasoned that probation
conditions that include rehabilitative treatment for child abusers, coupled with
an order not to have custody of or live with any children, could be more
effective than a procreation condition.234 Probation conditions that restrict a
probationer's custody of children under any circumstance better serve to
protect potential victims.
235
In Oakley, the court expressed a belief that Oakley's sentence would
"rehabilitate" him from his persistent failure to pay child support.2 36 The court
also defended the procreation condition as protective of potential future
victims - Oakley's current children and any additional children that he might
probation... serves no rehabilitative purpose whatsoever.").
229. See State v. Kline, 963 P.2d 697, 699 (Or. Ct. App. 1998) (affirming condition that
ordered defendant to complete drug treatment and anger management programs successfully
before fathering any more children).
230. Id.
231. See Howland v. State, 420 So. 2d 918, 919-20 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (finding
procreation condition redundant because another condition met probationary goals). The court
stated:
[A]lthough this [procreation] condition ...could reasonably relate to future
criminality - i.e., child abuse - it could do so only if appellant had custody of the
child or was permitted to have contact with the child. In this case, however, those
possibilities have already been foreclosed, since appellant is prohibited from having







236. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200,207 (Wis. 2001) (discussing with approval trial
court's judgment that Oakley's sentence would "rehabilitate Oakley while protecting society and
potential victims... from future wrongdoing"), cert. denied, 537 U.S. ___, 123 S. Ct. 74
(2002).
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beget." If the court's goal was to force Oakley to pay child support, both for
his current children and for any future children, then the court could have
achieved that probationary goal by making payment of child support a condi-
tion of his probation."3 Conditioning Oakley's right to procreate upon pay-
ment of child support achieved nothing for Oakley's current children if Oakley
chose not to have additional offspring. 239 As the probation condition specified,
if Oakley failed to pay further child support and then had another child, he
would go to prison, which would render him unable to support any of his
children.
240
C. Enforcement Problems Revisited
A procreation condition should be unenforceable if the probationer is
unsure how to comply.2 41 Because courts generally consider bans on sexual
activity to be invalid,242 a procreation condition actually demands that the
probationer use birth control.243 This demand makes procreation conditions
difficult to enforce because no birth control methods are one hundred percent
effective.
244
Although the effectiveness of birth control methods varies, probationers
face criminal sanctions if the birth control fails.245 In order to tailor a procre-
237. See id. at 208 (identifying Oakley's current and future children as "child victims").
238. See id. at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("Under Wisconsin law,. . . court-determined
support obligations may be enforced directly via wage assignments, civil contempt proceedings,
and criminal penalties." (quoting Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 389-90 (1978))).
239. See id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that "the condition of probation is not
triggered until Oakley's next child is born").
240. Cf United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992) ("If Smith were to
violate this [procreation] condition..., he may well be returned to prison, leaving him no way
to provide for his dependents.").
241. See Arthur, supra note 81, at 84 (arguing that "[p]rocedural due process .. . is
violated when a court imposes a condition that is vague or indefinite").
242. See State v. Pilcher, 242 N.W.2d 348, 358-59 (Iowa 1976) (finding that "State may
not interfere with the private sexual relations of consenting adults"); State v. Saunders, 381
A.2d 333, 340 (N.J. 1977) ("[S]exual activities between adults are protected by the right of
privacy.").
243. See People v. Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 n.12 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (noting that
trial judge had not attempted to impose ban on sexual intercourse: "I would never require
somebody to have no sexual activity; I don't think that's even suggested") (internal quotations
omitted).
244. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., BIRTH
CONTROL GUIDE (1997) (summarizing effectiveness of birth-control devices), available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/features/1997/babytab.html.
245. See State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (criticizing procreation
condition because "[tihe State should not have the power to penalize Mosburg if she uses
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ation condition narrowly, a court might consider specifying the method of birth
control that the probationer should use. However, such an order creates other
problems. In the early 1990s, a few trial courts directed probationers to
employ a specific method of birth control, Norplant, in order to comply with
procreation conditions."' In addition to engendering public and academic
criticism, the orders failed to take into account the fact that Norplant was a
prescription form of birth control and was not appropriate for all women.247
Further complicating the matter, no corresponding option was available for
male probationers, who had to choose among using a condom (with its rela-
tively low rate of effectiveness248), obtaining a vasectomy, or trusting partners
to employ female methods of birth control effectively.
249
Another enforcement problem existed in Oakley that is unique to child
support cases." The Oakley opinion left unresolved the troublesome issue
of exactly what amount of money Oakley needed to pay in order to satisfy his
condition."1 The opinion stated that Wisconsin courts usually issue support
orders based on a percentage of income; if that is true, then Oakley would
have needed only a small income to satisfy his condition.252 However, the
probation condition that the court upheld phrased the requirement differently:
in order to exercise his right to procreation, Oakley must "meet[ the needs of
his other children and [show that he] can meet the needs of' a new child.253
contraceptives which for some reason fail to prevent pregnancy").
246. See Jim Persels, The Norplant Condition: Protecting the Unborn or Violating
FundamentalRights?, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 237, 238 (1992) (describing California trial-court case
in which defendant's probation conditions included order to use Norplant, prescription birth
control that lasts five years).
247. See Arthur, supra note 81, at 97-99 (discussing difficulties with courts ordering
defendants to use Norplant because it requires prescription).
248. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMiN., BIRTH
CONTROL GUIDE (1997) (summarizing effectiveness of birth-control devices, including condoms
at 86% effective), available at http://www.fda.gov/fdac/featurea/1997/babytabl.html.
249. See DEP'T OF HEALTH& HUMAN SERvs., U.S. FoOD AND DRuG ADMIN., WHAT KIND
OF BIRTH CONTROL Is BEST FOR YOU? (Mar. 2000) (describing available birth control methods
for men and women, but including only vasectomy and condoms as available methods for men),
available at httpJ/www.fda.gov/opacom/lowlit/brthcon.html.
250. See State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200, 217 (Wis. 2001) (Bradley, J., dissenting)
(discussing improbability that David Oakley will ever be able to support his children fully), cert
denied, 537 U.S. __, 123 S. Ct. 74 (2002).
251. See id. at 201, 205 n.19 (stating that Oakley's condition required him not to have
another child unless he demonstrated "that he can support that child and his current children"
and noting that support orders in Wisconsin generally use percentage of income).
252. See id. at 205 n.19 ("In Wisconsin, a circuit court typically orders support payments
as a percentage of a parent's income, not as an invariable dollar amount.").
253. Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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A dissenting justice called this condition an award of constitutional reproduc-
tive rights according to a "sliding scale of wealth."254 The majority never
resolved the question of exactly how much Oakley needed to pay in order to,
satisfy his condition.
V. Conclusion
Since the late 1960s, appellate courts in the United States have decided
sixteen cases involving procreation conditions. 5 In 1998, although case law
suggested that the state courts universally considered procreation conditions
invalid, an Oregon court upheld a procreation condition in Kline."6 Three
years later, the Wisconsin Supreme Court upheld another such condition in
Oakley.257 The precedent that Kline and Oakley may establish warrants a
close examination of the rights and consequences involved in a procreation
condition.
Courts that have examined procreation conditions for validity have stated
that a special probation condition is subject to close examination when it
infringes upon a fundamental right.259 A line of Supreme Court decisions
establishes choice in reproductive decisionmaking as a fundamental right.26
Courts therefore should tailor procreation conditions closely to meet the goals
of probation: the rehabilitation of the probationer and the protection of
society and potential victims. 261  However, procreation conditions do not
rehabilitate probationers and are not the most effective means of protecting
society or future victims.262
254. See id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting) ("[B]y allowing the right to procreate to be
subjected to financial qualifications, the majority imbues a fundamental liberty interest with a
sliding scale of wealth.").
255. See supra note 2 (listing appellate cases that have examined procreation conditions).
256. See supra note 3 (listing cases that had struck down procreation conditions as of
1998); supra note 27 (discussing Kline and its holding).
257. See supra note 36 (discussing Oakley and its holding).
258. See supra Part V (discussing unconstitutionality and impracticality of Kline and
Oakley conditions).
259. See supra Part II.B (examining constitutional right to privacy in reproductive
decisionmaking for probationers).
260. See supra Part llA (explaining constitutional basis for fundamental right to procre-
ation under Supreme Court case law).
261. See supra Part IVA (describing common goals of probation).
262. See supra Part IV, V.B (examining procreation conditions in light of goals of
probation).
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In addition, procreation conditions are unenforceable.26 Law enforce-
ment cannot, in practical terms, supervise probationers closely enough to
,prevent conception, and courts cannot order the most effective prescription
birth control methods.2" Moreover, probationers who conscientiously prac-
tice birth control may still experience an unwanted pregnancy.2"5 In such a
case, a probationer faces imprisonment upon the birth of a child, and therefore
the probationer must choose among concealing the pregnancy (thereby reduc-
ing the chance of proper prenatal medical care), obtaining an abortion, or
going to prison after the child's birth.2" Such choices are untenable for courts
to impose upon probationers.
Courts have wide discretion in setting special probation conditions to be
sure that convicted criminals can function safely in society.267 Procreation
conditions are neither a valid nor a viable exercise of that discretion.2" Courts
therefore should disregard the precedent of Kline and Oakley and impose
conditions, such as prohibiting custody of children, that are more effective and
that are less restrictive of fundamental rights.
263. See supra Part IV.C (discussing enforcement problems of procreation conditions);
supra Part V.C (same).
264. See supra notes 168-72 and accompanying test (questioning practicality of having
probation officers enforce procreation conditions).
265. See DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERvS., U.S. FOOD AND DRUG ADMIN., BIRTH
CONTROL GUIDE (1997) (summarizing effectiveness of birth-control devices), available at
http://www.fda.gov/fdac/featurea/1997/babytabl.html.
266. State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (characterizing Mosburg's
choices, should she become pregnant while on probation, as concealing her pregnancy, having
abortion, or going to prison).
267. See supra notes 227-35 and accompanying text (giving examples of other means
available to achieve goals of probation).
268. See supra Parts IV, V (discussing impracticality and invalidity of procreation
conditions).
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